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FORM AND SUBSTANCE IN THE LAW 
by Ewell E. Mtlrphy, Jr. 
The substance of the Iaw is its characterization of human conduct in the 
abstract. For example, the law tells us that an offer and an acceptance make 
a contract, that negligent harm is a tort, and that an unexcused intentional 
death is murder. In this sense contrcrct, tort, and murder are purely theo- 
retical classifications, without practical consequence. 
The form of the law is the procedure by which these abstract character- 
izations are applied, through the mechanism of the courts, to the particular 
conduct of actual persons. Here the theoretical classifications take on prac- 
tical consequences. The contract-breaker and the tort-feasor are made to 
pay money damages; the murderer is jailcd or killed. 
Law schools emphasize the apparent distinction between form and sub- 
stance by separating "form" courses - like Proeedurc, Evidence, and Juris- 
diction of Courts - from "substance" courses - like Contracts, Torts, and 
Criminal Law. In the through-the-lookin~-glass world of Conflict of Laws, 
where results hinge upon whether a given rule is thought to be procedural 
or substantive, distinguishing between form and substance becomes a sub- 
stantive matter in itself. It is not surprising that in the workaday vocabulary 
of lawyers form and substance become complenientary concepts, polarizing 
into opposites. 
But this a false dichotomy. The law mingles its clcments of form and 
substance too diRusely for polarity; they are too creatively interdependent 
to be merely complementary. Considered thoughtfully, the interplay of 
form and substance in the law presents three paradoxical truths. Research- 
ing the law's origins with the acumen of a Maitland, we find that Jorin cre- 
crtes J ~ ~ ~ S I N I Z C E .  Probing the law's pretensions with the gentle skepticism of 
a Galbraith, we conclude that for-ix co~lcecrls .sriDsfance. Stripping the law 
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of its syllogisms, looking through verbiage to find function, we glimpse the 
more fundamental truth that form constitutes substance. A historian's truth, 
a skeptic's truth, and a philosopher's truth: these are the three facets of 
form and substance in the law. 
We would like to believe that substance preceded form when English 
law began. In our reverie we see King Arthur summon Sir Launcelot, hand 
him a copy of the Court-Martial Manual, and send him off to subdue the 
Welshmen by the book. Unfortunately for our romantically logical imagina- 
tion, it did not happen that way. The common law did not begin with a 
book or a system. It was stitched together ex post facro from the patches 
and tatters of a million isolated judgments, each of them concerned not with 
legal theory but with the practical solution of a concrete dispute. Launcelot 
left with a sword, not a book. T o  judge the Welshmen the King sought a 
Merlin, not a Launcelot - and did not command him to administer a co- 
herent body of law, but simply to decide hard cases. 
English-speaking lawyers did not rediscover the primacy of form over 
substance until the nineteenth century. Then our legal scholars, spurred by 
their German colleagues, began to study the common law as a historical 
phenomenon rather than a philosophical system. Sir Henry Maine's book, 
Arlcierlt Law, was a landmark of the new technique. F. W. Maitland fol- 
lowed with his legal histories, exhaustively researched and impeccably 
stated. In Boston the young Holmes wrote a remarkable volume, The 
C017~~71017 LOW, which still stands as the most eloquently argued array of 
legal insights ever produced on this continent. 
Their consensus was that the substance of the common law is best under- 
stood as the consequence of the formal procedural writs - the Forms of 
Action - by which medieval English claimants were permitted to bring 
suit in the King's courts. "So great is the ascendancy of the Law of Actions 
in the infancy of Courts of Justice," Maine asserted, "that substantive law 
has at first the look of being gradually secreted in the interstices of pro- 
cedure."' Maitland put it more epigrammatically: "The forms of action we 
have buried, but they still rule us from their graves."Holmes agreed: ". . . 
whcnever we trace a leading doctrine of substantive law far enough back, 
we are very likely to find some forgotten circumstance of procedure at its 
source."" Implicit in this emphasis on procedure is the postulate that law 
does not preexist but is created by the very act of judging. "The only 
authoritative statement of right and wrong," Maine said, "is a judicial 
sentence after the facts, not one presupposing a law which has been vio- 
lated, but one which is breathed for the first time by a higher power into 
the judge's mind at the moment of adjudication."' 
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That these observations do not fall strangely on our ears is a measure 
of the profound influence legal historians have had on the teaching of law 
in the twentieth century. Whether honored in the breach or in the observ- 
ance, the case system has become the hallmark of American lawyers' train- 
ing. This system assumes that actual judicial opinions are the brick and 
mortar of the law. In examining opinions students are taught to winnow 
the ratio deciderldi from obitet. dicta, in the belief that a judge's acts are 
more significant than his reasoning. The stress is on specifics rather than 
generalities, on results rather than explanations, on case-by-case adjudica- 
tion rather than consistency or logic. The case is the thing. Clustering in- 
dividual decisions into habituated trends, rationalizing those trends into 
rules, fitting the rules into a logically consistent body of law - this is the 
work of centuries, But first comes judging, before the law; it is a case of 
form creating substance. 
I11 
Twentieth century man regards himself with a skepticism that would have 
shocked Grandmother. This is the Age of Pop-Psych; we have all become 
amateur psychoanalysts. The naughty new words of the Viennese consulting 
rooms - like "e, "0 ," "id," " repression," and "wish-fulfillment"-have long 
since passed into the sturdy American vernacular of Norman Vincent Peale 
and Dear Abby. I t  is a post-Freudian platitude that men's motivations run 
too dccp for self-detection, that self-consciousness is a powerful vehicle for 
self-serving rationalization. 
But with skepticism has come tolcrancc. If I am, willy-nilly, ruled by my 
subconscious desires and deceived by my conscious mind, how can I expect 
a more creditable performance from you? So we come to assume and accept 
a degree of self-delusion in each other. The greater the gap between a man's 
announced purposes and his obvious motives, the more likely we are to 
react with empathy rather than with indignation. 
Unfortunately we have not yet come to view our legal institutions with 
the same tolerant skepticism that we bear for our neighbors. We like to take 
the poetry of our constitutions as literally as the prose of our income tax 
regulations. We fall, time and again, for the fallacy that the dynamics of 
social relationships can be embalmed forever in the letter of the law. We 
forget that the law, like the human personality, develops self-consciously, is 
sometimes moved by urges too primordial to mention, often misrepresents 
its motives, and nearly always wears a mask of order and consistency. 
The law is a vital, thrusting, growing thing, as earthy and elemental as 
the society it serves. But the law covets respectability, and long ago it 
learned Emerson's lesson that a foolish consistency is the hobgoblin of little 
minds. "The lawyer's truth is not truth, but consistency, or a consistent 
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expediency."To secure its sway over little minds the English common law 
took the hobgoblin of consistency for its patron saint and the syllogism for 
its sacrament. Its credo was the doctrine of stare decisis, which asserted that 
judicial decisions must follow the precedents of previous cases. In theory 
courts never made law, but merely applied existing law to the facts at hand. 
If precedents were obscure courts were supposed to interpolate mechani- 
cally with the impersonal calipers of analogy; only Parliament could 
legislate. 
This, of course, is nonsense; or, to put it more politely, it is a good gen- 
eral proposition that does not bear close analysis - a sort of telescopic 
truth and microscopic falsehood. Measured institutional change has always 
been the price of national survival. "Those societies which cannot combine 
reverence to their symbols with freedom of revision, must ultimately decay 
either from anarchy, or from the slow atrophy of a life stifled by useless 
shadows."" Judge-made law must change, no less than legislature-made law. 
Judges must legislate, in the sense that every application of law to facts and 
every choice between competing analogies involve change, however imper- 
ceptible. And those applications and choices are inescapably influenced by 
the judges' own subjective prefercnccs. As Holnles said: 
T h e  life of the law has not been logic: it has been experience. T h e  felt necessities 
o f  the time, the prevalent moral and political theories. intuitions of publtc 
policy. avowed o r  trncon\cloLrs, even the prejuclices which judges share with their 
fellow-men. have hrcd a good deal more to  d o  than the syllogism in determining 
the rules by wh~cl i  men ~ h o ~ r l d  be governcct 7 
In form [ t h e  law's] g routh  i \  l og~ca l  The  official theory is that each new deci- 
sion follows syllogi\tically f'loni existtng precedent\ . . . On the other hand, in 
substance the growth of the law i5 legc\latrve, . . . T h e  very congiderations which 
j~tdges most rarely mcnt~on.  ant1 nlways w ~ f h  a n  apology, a re  the secret root 
from which the law draw5 all the juice5 of l ~ f e  I mean, of course. considerations 
of what 1s expeclient for the cornrn~rnity concerned.< 
This is the skeptic's truth: that the judging process is objective and log- 
ical in form, but subjcctive and intuitive in substance. This truth providcs 
a significant insight into thc legislation-by-case-law practiced by English 
common law courts. It is even niorc illuniitiating in the United States. where 
courts claim the right to interpret, not only case law and statutes, but the 
very Constitution on which our nation is grounded. 
From the viewpoint of our English heritage the American system gives 
judges a remarkable dcgrce of power. The English Constitution is a wispy 
pastiche of tradition and scntiment, as old as memory and as inchoate as 
tomorrow. Whcn English courts interprct it they can hardly be accused of 
usurping the formal amendment process, because there is nonc. The voice 
of Parliament,in any event, is final; English courts may interpret statutes but 
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have no authority to declare them unconstitutional. If Parliament should 
tonight pass by a majority of one a statute abolishing every English free- 
dom won since 1066 the Queen's judges would have no choice but to enforce 
it. 
The American Constitution, in contrast, is a tangible twelve-page docu- 
ment containing specific if idealistic rules for the governance of an under- 
developed eighteenth century agricultural society. I t  establishes a precise 
amendment procedure. It creates a Supreme Court but accords it no specific 
authority to interpret the Constitution or to declare legislation unconstitu- 
tional. Given the explicitness of the document and the rather subordinate 
role it assigns to the judiciary, in 1789 one would have guessed that the 
American system was truly a government of laws, not of men, and that 
constitutional amendment, rather than the courts, would have the final voice 
in the political development of the nation. 
Such a gucss would have reckoned without the energetic ingenuity of 
Chief Justice Marshall, since whose day we have allowed the Supreme 
Court to exercise the quasi-amendatory function of adjusting constitutional 
provisions to meet the felt necessities of newer ~enerations. Ours is a 
peculiarly American compromise between the unwritten English Constitu- 
tion, which can be changed with a stroke of the Parliamentary pen, and 
the rigid written constitutions of Continental Europe, which in theory can- 
not be changed by parliaments or courts but in practice are periodically 
upset by revolution. There are, in effect, two mechanisms for amending the 
American Constitution: thc formal procedure described in Article V and 
the informal procedure of judicial interpretation. In practice the latter has 
been the more pervasive. Except for the Bill of Rights (which was bar- 
gained for as part of the ratification package) and the Civil War Amend- 
ments (which were cocrcively instituted) formal amcndmcnt has produccd 
only relatively minor changes, many of them procedural in character. The 
informal proccss of amendment by judicial interprctatio!~ has made far 
more sweeping constitutional revisions, including the legitimation of the 
great social revolution of our time. 
Informal aniendn1cnt is dificult because the Supreme Court is expected 
to behave like a court - with consistency and logic - and not Iike a 
parliament. LegisIative musclc must not show too crudely beneath the judi- 
cial robes of precedent and analogy. But the Supreme Court does legislate, 
as did the common law courts bcfore it, when constitutional tradition be- 
comes grossly unresponsive to public opinion. In small mattcrs the process 
is inconspicuous, but when the storms of discontent break upon our federal 
house the Supreme Court must sometimes become the all-too-visible light- 
ning rod which dissipates the thunderbolts of change into circuits of quiet 
adjustment. It is a measure of our popular misunderstanding of the Court's 
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function that when the storm is a t  its height instead of marveling at the 
lightning we often choose to curse the lightning rod. 
The thunderbolts of change have been crashing down for half a genera- 
tion now, and the Supreme Court has again assumed an activist role in re- 
shaping our political institutions. The greatest innovations have come in 
areas of volatile public concern: racial segregation, church-and-state, the 
rights of criminal trial, and legislative apportionment. In  each area the 
Court's trail was blazed by a substantial body of public opinion; and in 
desegregation, at  least, the Court's position, once established, has been oc- 
cupied and extended by the Congress. But with each innovation the Supreme 
Court was bitterly condemned for disregarding precedent. Its most vehe- 
ment critics phrased the issue in terms of hypocrisy and usurpation. Courts 
are supposed to adjudicate, not legislate, they said; the Supreme Court may 
only apply the Constitution, not changc it. Or in the less fastidious language 
of the John Birch Society, "Impcach Earl Warren." 
This argument misses the point. Courts have always legislated, common 
law courts as well as the Supreme Court of the United States. Stretching 
and bending our Constitution is a nceessary if thankless task, and we have 
developed no institution better equipped than the Supreme Court for per- 
forming it. Long before Charles Evans Hughes dared to admit it, most 
Americans realized that, ultimately, "the Constitution is what the judges 
say it is.""ut to many thoughtful admirers of the American system the de- 
cisions of the Warren Court do present a serious question of degree and 
technique. 
In its zeal to right old wrongs did the Court move too rapidly and with too 
little regard for the judicial proprieties? Was Brown v .  Borrid of Educatioi~~~'.  
dangerously ahead of its time in compelIing the integration of public school 
facilities? Would there have been fewer troops at Little Rock and fewer 
broken windows at Ole Miss if Chief Justice Warren had written less like a 
sociologist and more like a lawyer whcn he overruled Plessy v. Ferguson?ll 
Will history hold with Justices Frankfurter and Harlan that Brrker v. Cc1r.r" 
was an unwarranted meddling in local politics? Is the venerable American 
institution of public school prayer really inimical to the First Amendment?'" 
Do Girleon v. Wcriizwiiglrt," Escobedo v. Illirzois,l-> and Mirnnda v. Ari- 
zona"' require more criminal defense lawyers and better schooled policenlen 
than our infrastructure can provide? Do all these decisions, taken together, 
so far exceed the convcntional scope of judicial amendment as to discredit 
the Supreme Court as an instrument of government? 
We may venture some tentative answers to these qucstions. With more 
than a decade of hindsight, public opinion seems to view the Brown deci- 
sion as correct in result and not unreasonably hasty in timing. In any event, 
with passage of the post-Biowiz Civil Rights Acts the Congress resumed 
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the initiative in desegregation, and now the Black Power movement appears 
to have cooled the egalitarian ardor of Congress and Court alike. The prin- 
ciple of Bnker v. Carr has been applied, through redistricting, to the 
United States House of Representatives, but formal Constitutional amend- 
ment may have the last word to say about the structure of state senates. The 
school prayer decisions are unenforced, and perhaps unenforceable, in 
many parts of the nation. The criminal rights cases are widely unpopular, 
but the verdict of history is not yet in; if the taxpayers answer Gideotz's 
trumpet with adequate budget support for policemen and public defenders, 
perhaps the next generation of economists will arise up and call the Supreme 
Court blessed for thus diverting excess purchasing power to the public sec- 
tor. One thing is certain: by the time our federal system has finally as- 
similated or rejected the activist innovations of the Warren Court the Amer- 
ican public will have come much closer to appreciating the skeptic's truth 
that judicial form conceals legislative substance, at least as far as the United 
States Supreme Court is concerned. 
There is a good lesson for lawyers in Scene I1 of Shaw's play, Saint Joan. 
The setting is an antechamber of the Dauphin's palace. A flimsy test of 
Joan's supernatural power has been arranged. The Dauphin will be intro- 
duced to Joan as an ordinary courtier to see whether she can guess his 
royal identity. Although the Archbishop knows that it will be easy for Joan 
to recognize the Dauphin from his clothes and bearing, the Archbishop 
argues that Joan's success will nevertheless constitute a miracle. Pressed 
for his definition of a miracle, the Archbishop answers: 
A miracle, my friend, is an event which creates faith. That is the purpose and 
nature of miracles. They may seem very wonderful to the people who witness 
them, and very simple to those who perform them. That does not matter; if 
they confirm or create faith they are true miracles, 
A sound definition of miracles, the Archbishop's. Not the sort of thing 
to put in the Catechism, of course, and perhaps a shade too pragmatic to 
confide in the parish priest, but a useful definition for courtiers and prelates. 
The essential ingredicnt of miracles is not their supernatural origin but 
simply the fact that they are believed in. The test is not miraculousness, 
but faith. 
We must learn to judge a law by its consequences, as empirically as the 
Archbishop judged miracles. A law is not law because it can be deduced 
from the Ten Commandments, because it was passed by a legislature, be- 
cause it can bc spun into a syllogism, or because i t  is printed in a statute 
book. The essential ingrcdient of a law is merely that the community ob- 
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serves it. The test is not legality, but compliance. 
More specifically, the operat~ve question is the probability of enforce- 
ment. When a lawyer says that thus-and-so is "the law" he is merely pre- 
dicting that a court today would so hold and a sheriff tomorrow would 
execute that court's judgment. "The prophecies of what the courts will do 
in fact," Holmes said, "and nothing more pretentious, are what I mean by 
the law."" "LA1 legal duty so called is nothing but a prediction that if a man 
does or omits certain things he will be made to suffer in this or that way 
by judgment of the court . . ."I" Cardozo defined law as "that body of prin- 
ciple and dogma which with a reasonable measure of probability may be 
prcdicted as the basis for judgment in pending or future contro~ersies."~" 
The substance of the law, in other words, can be described only in terms of 
the probability of its procedural enforcement. In Professor Hart's character- 
ization of this vicw, "There is no law prohibiti~~g murder: there is only a law 
directing officials to apply certain sanctions in certain circumstances to 
those who do murder."'" Molmes and Cardozo would have added that even 
such a law is not law unless i t  is probable that the ofTicials will in fact 
apply the sanctions. 
Thcre is a telling illustration of this point in the United States Constitu- 
tion, which prcscribes thc substance and proof of treason in the following 
words: 
T~eason  agalnst the United State\, \hall consist only In levying War against them, 
or In adheling to the11 Enem~es, g~ving them Aid ant1 Comfort. No Person \hall 
bc conv~ctcd of T ~ e a w n  unles5 on the Testimony of two W~tnesses to the same 
ovet t Act, or on Confe5sion in open Cour t . 3  
A literal-minded reader would conclude that the first sentence states the 
substance of the law of treason by defining the offense and the second sen- 
tence merely describes the form by which treason may be proved. But the 
actual effect of the two sentences, taken together, is to incorporate the 
substance into thc form, because for purposes of punishing the tr?' ltor no 
conduct-however harmful in substance to the United States-can amount 
to trcason unless it is proved in the constitutional manner. In terms of 
Professor Hart's paraphrase, the Constitution does not prohibit trcason as 
such, but onIy such treason as can be proved by two witnesses or by a 
confession. 
The Constitution's definition of treason is a faithful microcosm of all law 
in that its substance is authoritatively fixed by the form in which it is to be 
applied. The dcclaration of a legal standard, standing alone, is never more 
than theoretical; it is the proccdure of enforcement that gives the standard 
its rcally consequential enunciation. From the standpoint of the tort plaintiff 
it may matter little what definition of negligence a court is bound to follow, 
but it will matter crucially whether that definition is to be applied by a 
FORM AND SUBSTANCE IN THE LAW 77 
judge or by a jury. The world's great disparities of criminal justice are not 
the product of differing codes of criminal law, but the consequence of 
divergent standards of criminal trial. 
Substantive law is in fact coterminous with, and has no practical existence 
apart from, the mechanics and probability of its enforcement. More pene- 
trating than the historian's truth that form creates substance, more signi- 
ficant than the skeptic's truth that form conceals substance, is the philoso- 
pher's truth: Form constitutes the real and only substance of the law. 
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